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According to Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quantity, rational talkers formulate their utterances
to be as economical as possible while conveying all necessary information. Naturally
produced referential expressions, however, often contain more or less information than
what is predicted to be optimal given a rational speaker model. How do listeners
cope with these variations in the linguistic input? We argue that listeners navigate the
variability in referential resolution by calibrating their expectations for the amount of
linguistic signal to be expended for a certain meaning and by doing so in a context- or a
talker-specific manner. Focusing on talker-specificity, we present four experiments. We
first establish that speakers will generalize information from a single pair of adjectives
to unseen adjectives in a speaker-specific manner (Experiment 1). Initially focusing
on exposure to underspecified utterances, Experiment 2 examines: (a) the dimension
of generalization; (b) effects of the strength of the evidence (implicit or explicit); and
(c) individual differences in dimensions of generalization. Experiments 3 and 4 ask
parallel questions for exposure to over-specified utterances, where we predict more
conservative generalization because, in spontaneous utterances, talkers are more likely
to over-modify than under-modify.
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INTRODUCTION
A key feature of human language is that there are many-to-many mappings between referents and
linguistic expressions. A pet dog can be referred to by many expressions (e.g., the dog, Charlie, he,
or my friend) whereas the expression the dog can be used to refer to a real dog, a toy dog, or a
contemptible person. Referential expressions can also be made arbitrarily long (e.g., the big dog, the
big brown dog, the big brown furry dog, etc.). One long-standing issue in psycholinguistic research
is how language users map a referential expression onto an intended referent with the speed and
accuracy evidenced in real time language use (e.g., Altmann and Steedman, 1988; Eberhard et al.,
l995; Allopenna et al., 1998; Arnold et al., 2000; Brown-Schmidt and Hanna, 2011).
One inﬂuential hypothesis is that listeners cope with this mapping problem by assuming that
speakers behave rationally, formulating their utterances to be as economical as possible while
conveying all necessary information (Grice, 1975). Hereafter, we call this the rational-speaker
model. For example, a rational speaker is more likely to use a pre-nominal scalar adjective (e.g.,
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the big dog) when there is a complement (contrast) set of referents
of the same semantic type (e.g., a big and one or more small
dogs) in the same context (Sedivy et al., 1999; Davies and
Katsos, 2009). By assuming a rational model of the speaker,
listeners can make predictions about the referring expression
that maximize the informativity of a linguistic element, where
informativity is deﬁned as the amount of uncertainty that is
reduced by the element given the set of plausible referents in
the current referential domain (Frank and Goodman, 2012).
Frank and Goodman (2012) tested the informativity hypothesis
using a simple language game. With three geometrical shapes
with two shape features and two colors (e.g., a blue square, a
blue circle, and a green square), comprehenders were asked to
pick the referent that best matched a single word description
(e.g., blue or square). A rational language user model predicts
that when given blue participants should most frequently choose
the blue square rather than the blue circle. This is because if
the talker had meant the blue circle, she should have used the
more informative (unambiguous) description circle. The results
conﬁrmed this prediction.
Real-time processing of prenominal adjectives is also
inﬂuenced by the assumption that the speaker is formulating her
utterances to eﬃciently pick out a referent given contextually
salient contrast sets. In a visual world study (Tanenhaus et al.,
1995), Sedivy et al. (1999) used spoken instructions such as
“Pick up the tall glass” in a visual workspace with a tall glass
and a short glass (which form a contrast set), a tall pitcher and
an unrelated object (e.g., a key). A rational speaker would use
the adjective “tall” to refer to the glass, which is a member of a
contrast set, and not the tall pitcher. If listeners use the context
and make this inference in real-time, as they hear the adjective,
“tall,” they should begin to look at the tall glass. This is just the
result reported by Sedivy et al. (also see Hanna et al., 2003; Heller
et al., 2008; Wolter et al., 2011).
Although these results are consistent with a rational model
of reference generation and understanding, some researchers
have questioned whether a rational model will scale up to
account for interlocutors’ behavior in everyday language use.
Spontaneously produced referential expressions often include
information that would be superﬂuous under the assumption
that the speaker should only provide necessary and suﬃcient
information. For example, spontaneous utterances often contain
prenominal modiﬁers that are not necessary for identifying a
unique referent (Deutsch and Pechmann, 1982; Sonnenschein,
1984; Pechmann, 1989; Belke, 2006; Engelhardt et al., 2006; see
also Koolen et al., 2011). For instance, 30% of speakers used
superﬂuous adjectives in a production study in Engelhardt et al.
(2006) and 50% in Nadig and Sedivy (2002).
Conversely, interlocutors frequently under-specify in highly
speciﬁc circumstances. In Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus (2008),
interlocutors were tasked with rearranging blocks on puzzle
boards. Areas in the workspace were divided into sub-regions.
More than 50% of the referential expressions were underspeciﬁed
with respect to potential referents in the relevant sub-region.
Nonetheless, these utterances were seamlessly interpreted by the
listener. Analyses showed that underspeciﬁed utterances only
occurred when the alternatives were unlikely to be the intended
referent given the local task constraints. For example a speaker
might say, “put it above the red block,” when there were two red
blocks but only one had a free space above it.
In sum, in relatively simple situations, like those typically
examined in psycholinguistic studies, talkers often over-specify.
In contrast, in more complex situations with richly structured
discourse context, talkers frequently under-specify. For purposes
of the present work, we will be focusing on situations where over-
speciﬁcation in the form of “redundant” prenominal adjectives is
quite common and under-speciﬁcation is relatively infrequent.
How can we reconcile the ubiquitous over-speciﬁcation
in these situations with the evidence that listeners seem to
assume that a prenominal adjective is included to form a
maximally informative utterance with respect to the context?
One possibility is that the rational assumption is only one
of many relevant factors that the talker and the listener take
into account, rather than a strong determinant of reference
generation and understanding. For example, in an interactive
communication game, Engelhardt et al. (2006) reported
comprehenders’ asymmetrical reactions to over- and under-
modifying expressions. Comprehenders judged an ambiguous,
under-specifying, expression in the presence of more than one
plausible candidate to be less than optimal. However, they
did not seem to draw additional inferences from superﬂuous,
over-specifying, descriptors (see also Davies and Katsos, 2010,
for evidence of asymmetrical penalization of over- vs. under-
modiﬁed expressions by adults and children in a non-interactive
task). Based on these asymmetrical ﬁndings between under-
and over-informative utterances, Engelhardt et al. (2006, p. 572)
concluded, “people are only moderately Gricean.”
Before adopting this conclusion, there is another approach
that we believe is worth exploring. This approach is motivated,
in part, by work that reevaluates what it means to be rational
in decision-making. In a seminal line of research, Tversky
and Kahneman (1974) documented ways in which human
agents systematically deviate from the rational models widely
assumed within economics. They proposed that people rely on
heuristics, such as availability, similarity and representativeness
that can result in fallacies leading to non-rational, or non-logical,
decision-making under many circumstances. One such case is
the “conjunction fallacy” where given a scenario about, Linda,
a college-educated woman who cares deeply about social issues,
participants will rate the likelihood the Linda is bank teller and
a feminist as greater than the likelihood that she is a bank
teller (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983). This clearly violates a
basic rule of logic and probability—a conjunction cannot contain
more members than either of its conjuncts. These fallacies were
therefore taken to suggest that human agents are not rational in
their decision-making behaviors.
However, the same evidence can be viewed as consistent with
the hypothesis that participants are behaving according to basic
assumptions about the rationality of language users. One of
the assumptions is relevance in information. In Grice’s terms,
“Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they
did” (Grice, 1975, p. 45, emphasis original). Based on this
assumption, when the talker provides certain information (e.g.,
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Linda is a feminist), the listener infers that she must have had a
reason to do so with respect to the goal of achieving successful
communication. Rationality, in this sense, manifests itself in the
general tendency for language users to engage in goal-directed
acts of communication even in the simple task used by Tversky
and Kahneman rather than simply treating the scenario as an
abstract logical problem (Hertwig and Gigerenzer, 1999; also see
Oaksford andChater, 2001 for a similar approach applied to other
decision problems). Thus what might appear to be departures
from rationality are in fact grounded in principled behaviors that
overall lead to more successful communication1.
When we apply this perspective to reference generation
and comprehension, it seems plausible that what we might
view as departures from the rational-speaker model could, in
fact, be fully consistent with a rational perspective. Let us
assume that one of the most prominent goals of linguistic
communication is to successfully convey intended messages and
that this communication takes place through a noisy channel.
It is essential, then, for the speaker to provide listeners with
suﬃcient information while taking into account the likely
possibility that some information will be lost due to noise in the
production and comprehension systems (e.g., Aylett and Turk,
2004; Levy and Jaeger, 2007; Jaeger, 2010; Gibson et al., 2013). In
particular, early in an interaction, interlocutors are likely to have
uncertainty about the relevant context that bears on the current
interaction and the degree to which they have shared goals and
experience, etc. There is also variability in how well-diﬀerent
talkers and listeners take into account each other’s perspective,
individual diﬀerences along dimensions, such as spatial ability,
and diﬀerences in speech style (e.g., the degree to which abrupt
utterances are considered impolite). Given these considerations,
it can be rational to provide more information than what is
minimally required, rather than trying to estimate what degree
of speciﬁcation is optimal. This tendency is likely strengthened in
non-interactive tasks in which a talker cannot negotiate with her
listener during the interaction.
Indeed, there is evidence that listeners can take into
account such communicative considerations from the speaker’s
perspective. Davies and Katsos (2009) proposed that the
higher tolerance for over-informative expressions in Engelhardt
et al. (2006) arises because these expressions can plausibly
be attributable to communicative reasons (e.g., an extra eﬀort
for avoiding ambiguity). When the redundancy is unlikely
to beneﬁt communication, comprehenders found the over-
informative utterances to be sub-optimal just as they do for
under-informative utterances. Davies and Katsos’ (2009) results
suggest that listeners do not simply judge whether an expression
is over-informative given a referent, but they reason about why
the speaker produced an additional element with respect to the
goal of successful communication. As conversation unfolds and
1Our comments apply only to how people weight evidence that is presented
verbally, as in the Linda problem. Many of the Tversky and Kahneman heuristics
that lead to fallacies are based on the people’s priors being distorted, e.g.,
overestimating the likelihood of events like airplane crashes, children being
kidnapped, and infection from Ebola because the input, e.g., news coverage, is
distorted. Thus people might make judgments and decisions that are objectively
incorrect, even if their reasoning followed the principles of rational inference.
as interlocutors have an increasingly coordinated construal of
common ground, expectations for referring expressions are also
tightened in a talker- and context-speciﬁc manner (Metzing and
Brennan, 2003; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2015; Kronmüller and
Barr, 2015). As a result, what might appear to be an ambiguous
referring expression becomes fully informative for interlocutors,
allowing them to communicate more eﬃciently (Brown-Schmidt
and Tanenhaus, 2008).
From this perspective, in contrast to Engelhardt et al.’s (2006)
proposal, we hypothesize that variations found in referring
expressions reﬂect rational principles for maximizing overall
communicative success under uncertain conditions. We posit
that listeners assume that talkers are generally Gricean, rather
than only sometimes Gricean. Crucially, our framework assumes
that (1) listeners expect talkers to vary in their choices of
referential expressions and that (2) listeners constantly adapt
their expectations about how much linguistic information a
particular talker might provide to convey a particular referential
intention. This allows listeners to navigate the variability in
referring expressions to arrive at the intended referent.
As a ﬁrst step in developing this approach, the current paper
tests whether and, if so, how listeners adapt their referential
expectations in simple communicative contexts similar to those
used in many other psycholinguistic studies discussed above. In
particular, we ask whether listeners adapt their expectations in
a talker-speciﬁc fashion. This question is motivated by Grodner
and Sedivy’s (2011) demonstration that listeners discount
linguistic evidence for contrastive inference when they are
told that the speaker has an impairment “that causes social
and linguistic problems.” When receiving such a top–down
instruction, listeners no longer interpret prenominal modiﬁers
produced by the given talker as a meaningful cue to a contextual
contrast (cf. Sedivy et al., 1999). With such a case of pragmatic
impairment and a strictly rational model as two extreme ends
of a continuum, talkers will often vary in terms of how much
information they typically include in an utterance. Some talkers
will be prone to provide additional descriptors while others’
utterances are more succinct. Each talker, however, is likely to
be relatively consistent. To the extent that these assumptions
hold, ﬂexibly adapting an expected form of an utterance for
a given talker will prevent listeners from going astray when
they encounter more or less information than what is a priori
expected.
To test this hypothesis, we created an experimental paradigm
with an Exposure Phase and a Generalization Phase. In the
Exposure Phase the input from one of two speakers deviates from
what is expected based on the rational speaker model. Speciﬁcally,
that speaker does or does not use a scalar adjective (e.g.,
big/small) that would be necessary for singling out a referent,
or if used, would provide redundant information (under- and
over-modifying speakers given the rational model). We then
examine in a Generalization Phase whether listeners derive
diﬀerent referential expectations for these two speakers (i.e.,
talker-speciﬁc expectation adaptation). In addition, we present
a previously unseen set of adjectives in the Generalization
Phase to examine the robustness of the adaptation process.
We hypothesized that rational listeners would generalize from
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their experience, resulting in more accurate expectations for a
wider range of linguistic expressions than those for which they
have direct evidence. For example, upon observing utterances
with referring expressions from a talker who provides over-
speciﬁed expressions along one dimension (e.g., big/small), a
listener might infer that that talker would also be more likely
to over-specify along other dimensions (e.g., skinny/wide). (In
Experiments 3 and 4, we provide a direct test of this prediction
with adult native speakers of English.) We thus examine listeners’
adaptation of referential expectations for uses of observed and
unobserved adjectives.
One important factor that inﬂuences patterns of
generalization is listeners’ prior beliefs about how talkers might
vary in their reference generation. For example, an instance
of a seemingly over-specifying adjective can be compatible
with at least two hypotheses: (1) the talker is incapable of
making an optimally informative utterance (informativity-based
generalization), or (2) the talker prefers to produce a longer
utterance (length/form-based generalization). Also, listeners
need to determine if the over-speciﬁcation is conﬁned to (1) the
particular type of adjective, (2) adjectives in general, or (3) any
form of modiﬁcation. Moreover, one episode of sub-optimal
language use could be indicative of the talker’s overall pragmatic
ability or it could be a random production error, in which case it
would have little predictive power about future input. To avoid
over- and under-generalization, rational listeners must evaluate
the observed evidence against their prior beliefs to estimate how
reliably it conveys information about the pragmatic competence
of the talker (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007; for a theoretical
discussion on eﬀects of prior beliefs in phoneme adaptation and
generalization see Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2015). Based on
this assumption, we predict a critical diﬀerence in how listeners
generalize evidence of under- and over-speciﬁed utterances.
Given the prevalent over-modiﬁcation observed in natural
discourse, a single instance of a redundant adjective use provides
less reliable evidence that the speaker would be non-optimal
in other domains of pragmatic language use compared to a
single instance of under-speciﬁcation. Therefore, we should
see more conservative generalization (at the speaker-level)
from evidence of over-speciﬁcation compared to evidence of
under-speciﬁcation.
With the exception of pioneering work by Grodner and Sedivy
(2011), talker- or context-speciﬁc adaptation and generalization
of expectations have not thus far been studied extensively
with respect to reference resolution (but see Arnold et al.,
2007, for related discussion on comprehension of disﬂuencies).
However, the importance of adaptation and generalization
is increasingly appreciated in other domains of language
processing. In particular, talker- and context-speciﬁc adaptation
is crucial for comprehenders to navigate the problem of lack of
invariance between the acoustic signal perceived and underlying
linguistic categories such as phonemes. Some of this lack of
invariance is due to random factors, such as errors in production
and perception, but much is due to systematic factors, such
as diﬀerences between speakers, dialects/accents, and speech
conditions. A number of studies have demonstrated that listeners
condition their perception of phonetic categories on talkers and
their indexical features and learn to expect diﬀerent acoustic
features in the input for these diﬀerent groups of talkers and
diﬀerent situations (e.g., Strand and Johnson, 1996; Niedzielski,
1999; Bradlow and Bent, 2008; Reinisch and Holt, 2014; for
review see Drager, 2010; Kleinschmidt and Jaeger, 2015). Our
framework shares a number of important properties with models
developed to address the lack of invariance in speech perception.
Most importantly, we view the problem of reference resolution
as a form of systematic inference based on variable input in
which listeners condition their inferences taking into account
talker-speciﬁc information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We
present results of four sets of experiments, in which we
examine talker-speciﬁc generalization based on under-modiﬁed
(Experiments 1 and 2), and over-modiﬁed (Experiments
3 and 4) utterances. We ﬁrst establish that listeners will
generalize information from a single pair of adjectives to unseen
adjectives in a talker-speciﬁc manner based on observation
of under-modiﬁed utterances (see Experiment 1: Talker-
Speciﬁc Adaptation and Generalization Across Adjectives).
We then tease apart two possible dimensions of talker-based
generalization, which we call informativity-based and form-
based generalization. A single observation of an under-modiﬁed
utterance (e.g., “Click on the cup” in a presence of a big and a
small cups) could be interpreted as evidence that the talker has
a propensity to produce (1) under-informative expressions (i.e.,
informativity-based generalization) or (2) shorter expressions
(form-based generalization). By introducing modiﬁed, yet
under-informative utterances (e.g., “Click on the green cup”
when the big and the small cups are both green), we demonstrate
that whereas the generalization is primarily informativity-based
some listeners more frequently made form-based generalizations
(see Experiment 2A: Informativity-based vs. Form-based
Generalization for Talker-Speciﬁc Adaptation). The preference
for informativity-based generalization is magniﬁed when
the task is presented with an explicit instruction directing
comprehenders’ attention to diﬀerences between the talkers (see
Experiment 2B: Eﬀects of Adding a more Explicit Cue – Focus
on Naturalness), suggesting that construal of the task inﬂuences
how listeners generalize from the evidence that they observe.
We then turn to exposure to over-modiﬁed utterances. Given
the prevalence of such utterances in simple referring tasks,
we predict more conservative generalization across adjective
types compared to cases with under-modiﬁed utterances.
The results suggest that the over-modiﬁed utterances are
indeed unlikely to trigger informativity-based generalizations
(see Experiment 3: Talker-Speciﬁc Adaptation with Over-
Informative Evidence) although comprehenders do register that
the two talkers’ utterances diﬀer in length (see Ruling out
an Alternative Explanation based on a Failure to Generalize
overall for Over-Informative Utterances). This absence of
informativity-based generalization persisted even when an
extra manipulation highlighting the non-optimality of over-
modifying utterances in referential communication was added
(see Experiment 4: Drawing more Attention to the Fact that
Over-Informative Information is not Helpful). In the General
Discussion, we discuss an inference mechanism that provides
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a framework for explaining these diﬀerent patterns of talker-
speciﬁc generalizations of pragmatic information and suggests
promising venues for future investigations.
EXPERIMENT 1: TALKER-SPECIFIC
ADAPTATION AND GENERALIZATION
ACROSS ADJECTIVES
We ﬁrst asked whether listeners would generalize information
from observed to unobserved (new) adjectives in a talker-speciﬁc
manner. Importantly, because listeners are unlikely to be given
explicit, top–down information about pragmatic competence
under most circumstances, we wanted to determine whether they
would generalize without being explicitly told that the talker
was pragmatically impaired as they were in Grodner and Sedivy
(2011). In the Exposure Phase we introduced listeners to two
talkers and tasked them with selecting the unique referent of the
talker’s instruction from a set of four objects. The two talkers
varied in their descriptions: only one talker used adjectives to
pick out a unique referent (the modifying talker) while the
other talker consistently used bare nouns (the non-modifying
talker)2. In the Generalization Phase, we asked the listeners to
guess which talker likely uttered transcribed instructions that
were either modiﬁed (with new, or previously used adjectives) or
unmodiﬁed. If listeners had generalized their assumptions about
the talker’s adjective use, they should attribute both the observed
and new adjective use to the modifying talker, and the unmodiﬁed
instructions to the non-modifying talker.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two English-speaking adults residing in the USA were
recruited online using the crowdsourcing platform Amazon
Mechanical Turk (https://www.mturk.com/mturk/). Participants
were compensated $1.00 for participating in the task3, 4.
2We chose to refer to the talkers modifying and non-modifying for the following
two reasons. First, and most crucially, modifying/non-modifying and over-/under-
informative are two orthogonal dimensions. A modiﬁed utterance, e.g., “Click
on the big apple,” can be over- or under-informative given a visual scene and
comprehenders’ construal of the task. (Similarly, in Experiment 2, a color-modiﬁed
utterance is modiﬁed but under-informative.) In our experiments the two talkers
are distinguished by the forms of the utterances they use. Participants could either
attribute the diﬀerence between the talkers to diﬀerences in informativity or to
preferences in utterance length. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use modifying
and non-modifying to refer to the two talkers. Secondly, referring to the talkers as
modifying/non-modifying provides a coherent thread across all of the experiments.
With our current manipulation, the input sentences in the exposure phase are
identical across experiment (i.e., one talker produces modiﬁcation and the other
does not). Whether these utterances are informative or not diﬀers depending on
the visual context (i.e., experiment).
3All of the experiments discussed in this paper were carried out in accordance with
the recommendations of the Research Subjects Review Board at the University of
Rochester, all participants gave consent to participate in the studies. They were
given a digital copy of the consent form, and were asked to click a radio button
labeled “I accept” to indicate that they had read and understood the consent form.
All participants gave informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of
Helsinki.
4Amazon’s Mechanical Turk permits requesters to set selection criteria, and only
the Turkers that meet the selection criteria are shown the task in their list of
FIGURE 1 | An example of a trial (audio instructions are shown here in
speech bubbles) with the modifying speaker (left) and the
non-modifying speaker (right) from the Exposure Phase in
Experiments 1 and 2. Participants clicked on the image in the grid to
respond.
Materials
We created 44 two-by-two grids of images (20 for exposure items
and 24 for test items). Each grid has a contrast pair of images
diﬀering from each other in one dimension and distinguished
with a scalar adjective (e.g., a big cake vs. a small cake as in
Figure 1). The other two images were singletons.
Two native speakers of American English (one male and one
female) recorded 10 instructions each for the 20 exposure items.
All the instructions were of the form “Click on the ____” and
the two speakers recorded three versions for each item: a bare
noun (e.g., “Click on the cake”), and with the adjectives big (e.g.,
“Click on the big cake”) or small (e.g., “Click on the small cake”).
24 instructions were created for the Generalization Phase. One
third of the modiﬁed instructions had the adjectives used in
the Exposure Phase (four instructions each with big and small).
The remaining two thirds of the modiﬁed instructions used new
adjective pairs (four tall/short, four skinny/wide). Generalization
instructions were presented as written scripts.
Procedure
In the Exposure Phase, participants were shown two-by-two grids
of images. We provided a cover story that two naïve talkers had
participated in a production task and produced instructions of
the form “Click on the ___.” The job of current participants was
to follow these instructions and select one picture by clicking
on it. On 10 of the trials one of the speakers (the modifying
available HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks). For the purposes of this task we set
the selection criteria to include a location restriction to users in the USA, who have
an overall approval rate of 95% or higher, and who have not participated in any of
the other experiments related to those described in this paper. Participants were
told in the description of the task that we were looking only for native English
speakers (having learned English at the age of ﬁve or younger). Participants were
additionally excluded if they gave two or more incorrect responses on the modiﬁed
Exposure Phase (EP) trials in Experiments 1 and 2, on either type of EP trial in
Experiment 3, or non-modiﬁed EP trial in Experiment 4. Participants who viewed
the HIT but did not complete the task were excluded from the analyses, and are not
reported here.
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talker) made a request using a prenominal adjective such as,
“Click on the big/small cake” (ﬁve items with big and ﬁve items
with small). On the remaining 10 trials the other talker (the
non-modifying talker) produced instructions with bare nouns
(e.g., “Click on the cake”). On each trial an avatar depicted which
of the speakers the participant would hear on that trial (see
Figure 1 for an example of an Exposure Phase trial). The items
were presented in a randomized order. The location of the target
object, adjective (big vs. small), and gender of the modifying
talker were counterbalanced across participants. Participants
were instructed to make their best guess when they thought the
speaker was unclear, or if they were uncertain. Participants were
not given any feedback about their responses.
In the Generalization Phase, participants were told that they
would read instructions that had been transcribed. Their task
was to judge which of the two speakers was more likely to have
produced the instruction and click on the corresponding avatar
(Figure 2). 12 of the 24 instructions contained a modifying
adjective. Four of the modiﬁed instructions contained the
same adjectives as in the Exposure Phase (big/small); eight
contained new scalar adjective pairs (two skinny/two wide, two
tall/two short). On the remaining 12 trials the instructions were
unmodiﬁed. These items were presented in a randomized order.
The adjective-object pairing and type of instruction (modiﬁed
vs. unmodiﬁed) was counterbalanced across participants. After
making their selection participants were asked to rate how
conﬁdent they were in their response on a ﬁve-point scale
(1= not at all conﬁdent, and 5= completely conﬁdent).
Results and Discussion
Choices in the Generalization Phase are plotted in Figure 3.
Participants selected the modifying-speaker, who used
big/small in the Exposure Phase, for the sentences with
big/small (83%), and the non-modifying speaker in the
unmodiﬁed trials (80%). Choice patterns for new adjectives
were almost identical to those for exposure adjectives: 84
and 84% for skinny/wide, and 83 and 84% for tall/short.
We constructed a mixed-model logistic regression of
the responses given for the modifying speaker in the
Generalization Phase with Adjective (exposed or new), and
Instruction Type (modiﬁed or non-modiﬁed) as the ﬁxed
eﬀects, and subject and item as the random eﬀects5. We
based our model on the recommendations for maximal
Linear Mixed Eﬀects Model (LMEM) as suggested by Barr
et al. (2013) which takes into consideration the maximal
random eﬀects structure by including by-subject (Adjective
and Instruction Type) and by-item (Instruction Type)
random intercepts and slopes. We used the glmer function
in lme4 in R, and speciﬁed a BOBYQA optimizer (Bates
et al., 2015). As predicted, Instruction Type was the only
signiﬁcant predictor of whether participants would choose
the modifying speaker (β = 5.84, p < 0.001). There were
no reliable predictors of the conﬁdence ratings (ps = 1),
indicating that participants were equally certain (modiﬁed
mean = 3.8/5; non-modiﬁed mean = 3.81/5) about their
responses regardless of the Instruction Type and Adjective
(exposed or new).6
The results support two predicted eﬀects of the exposure
items. First, participants reliably track talker-speciﬁc usage
patterns of adjectives and choose the modifying talker for new
instructions with previously observed adjectives (i.e., big/small).
Second, participants generalized their assumptions to previously
unobserved scalar adjectives and chose the modifying talker
for instructions with new scalar adjectives. Thus listeners
5The same factors were used in a mixed-eﬀects logistical regression for all
experiments unless noted otherwise.
6In this and all of the other experiments we report below, the main eﬀects
(Instruction Type and Adjective) were not a signiﬁcant predictor of the conﬁdence
rating scores. Therefore, we do not discuss these results in subsequent experiments;
instead we report the data in the Figures.
FIGURE 2 | In the Generalization Phase participants saw 2x2 image grids (left) above the transcribed instructions, avatars that represented the two
speakers, and a confidence rating scale (right).
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FIGURE 3 | Results from Experiment 1, showing the proportion of responses given for the modifying talker by Instruction Type (left), and the
confidence ratings for responses by Instruction Type (right; diamond dots reflect the mean rating out of 5).
quickly adapt their expectations for a particular talker’s referring
expressions.
However, these results are compatible with at least two classes
of accounts. Participants could have inferred that one speaker
provided the suﬃcient amount of information to uniquely refer,
while the other did not (Informativity-based generalization).
Alternatively, participants could have inferred that one of
the speakers was more likely to produce modiﬁed utterances
(Form-based generalization). In Experiment 2, we modiﬁed
the instructions in the Generalization Phase to investigate
which account better predicts listeners’ adaptation/generalization
behavior.
EXPERIMENT 2: GENERALIZATION
FROM UNDER-INFORMATIVE EVIDENCE
Experiment 2A: Informativity-Based vs.
Form-Based Generalization for
Talker-Specific Adaptation
Experiment 2A examined whether participants inferred that one
of the speakers was more or less informative (Informativity-based
generalization) or generalized based on utterance length (Form-
based generalization). We replaced the bare noun instructions
in the Generalization Phase of Experiment 1 with orthogonal
color adjectives (e.g., Click on the green car when both cars in
the scene are green). If generalization is based on informativity,
participants should select the previously non-modifying (under-
informative) speaker. If, however, generalizations are form-
based (i.e., based solely on whether or not a speaker had
used an adjective), participants should select the modifying
speaker on both the color-adjective trials and the scalar adjective
trials.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-three English-speaking adults residing in the USA who
had not previously participated in a study in this series were
compensated $1.00 for taking part in the task on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. We applied the same exclusion criteria as what
we used in Experiment 1.
Materials
The visual and the audio materials for the Exposure Phase
were identical to those used in Experiment 1. We constructed
12 new instructions for the Generalization Phase by replacing
the non-modiﬁed instructions with instructions containing color
adjectives. These instructions were paired with two-by-two grids
with the contrastive item pair that diﬀered in size along the same
dimensions as the scalar adjectives used in the scalar modiﬁed
trials, but did not diﬀer in color. Thus, these color-modiﬁed
instructions such as “Click on the green bottle” would not pick out
a unique referent. The remaining 12 scalar-modiﬁed instructions
such as “Click on the wide bottle” (Figure 2), carried over
from Experiment 1, would pick out a unique referent. Thus, all
instructions in the Generalization Phase contained either a scalar
or a color adjective. Experiment 2A used the same instructions as
Experiment 1.
Procedure
Procedure was identical to Experiment 1. Participants were not
given feedback on their responses and asked to rate conﬁdence in
their selection after each item in the Generalization Phase.
Results and Discussion
Participants’ responses were similar to those in Experiment 1
(see Figure 4). For both observed and new scalar adjective types,
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FIGURE 4 | Results from Experiment 2A, showing the proportion of responses given for the modifying talker by Instruction Type (left; light gray bars
reflect individual participant means), and the confidence ratings for responses by Instruction Type (right; diamond dots reflect the mean rating
out of 5).
they primarily picked the modifying speaker (81%). However,
on the color-modiﬁed trials, participants showed preferences
for the non-modifying talker (68%). These results show that
participants are making informativity-based generalizations,
choosing the previously non-modifying talker for modiﬁed
yet under-informative instructions. The mixed-eﬀects logistic
regression found that the only reliable predictor of whether
the listener chose the modifying speaker on a given trial
was Instruction Type [scalar-modiﬁed (informative) vs. color-
modiﬁed (under-informative); β = 6.428, p< 0.001].
In sum, these results suggest that not only have participants
discovered that there is something linguistically diﬀerent between
the talkers, but also that one of these talkers was using pre-
nominal modiﬁcation to provide information that allows unique
reference, whereas the other was not. Participants were willing
to attribute new color-modiﬁed utterances to a talker they have
never heard using color adjectives to modify. Thus participants
have inferred that only one of the talkers uses modiﬁcation to
provide suﬃcient information for unique reference.
Comparison of Experiments 1 and 2A
We compared Experiments 1 and 2A using a mixed-eﬀects
logistic regression analysis with Experiment (1 vs. 2A), Adjective
(exposed vs. new), and Instruction Type (under- vs. concisely-
informative) as ﬁxed eﬀects, and subject and item as random
eﬀects, including by-subject (Adjective and Instruction Type) and
by-item (Experiment and Instruction Type) random intercepts
and slopes. We used a model with the correlations between the
random slopes and random intercepts removed as recommended
by Barr et al. (2013) when the maximal model fails to converge.
We found evidence that is comparable to what we found
in Experiment 1 for talker-speciﬁcity: Instruction Type was a
predictor of the responses for the modifying talker, β = 5.752,
p< 0.001. In addition, there was a predictive eﬀect of Experiment
(β= 0.807, p= 0.05). The predictive main eﬀect of Experiment is
likely driven by a smaller percentage of responses for the non-
modifying speaker on the color-modiﬁed trials in Experiment
2A in comparison to the percentage of responses for the non-
modifying speaker on the non-modiﬁed trials in Experiment 1.
To take a closer look at patterns of responses by individual
participants, we plotted mean proportion of choice of the
modifying talker with the light gray connecting bars in Figure 4.
It is evident that there is a substantial amount of individual
variation: while the majority of participants responded in a way
that reﬂects informativity-based generalizations (lower responses
for the modifying speaker on color-modiﬁed trials, and higher
responses on the scalar-modiﬁed trials), some participants seem
to be making form-based generalizations, as noted by relatively
invariant responses for the modifying speaker across both trial
types.We suspected that the individual diﬀerences stemmed from
the fact that participants diﬀered from each other in terms of
their construal of the current task. Some might have assumed
the goal of the task was to evaluate the clarity and helpfulness
of the instructions, which would have encouraged them to focus
on informativity of the instructions. Others might have tried to
match instructions in terms of their formal similarity. To test this
idea, we made this assumption explicit in our instructions to see
whether that would aﬀect patterns of participants’ responses.
Experiment 2B: Effects of Adding a more
Explicit Cue – Focus on Naturalness
In Experiment 2B, we repeated Experiment 2A but added an
extra instruction that asked the listeners to pay close attention
to potential speaker diﬀerences in “clarity” and “naturalness.”
We hypothesized that the explicit instruction would increase
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informativity-based generalizations by highlighting the fact that
instructions vary along the dimension of helpfulness in picking
out a unique referent. We also report two follow-up analyses.
First, we present a mixture model analysis of a combined dataset
from Experiments 2A and 2B to further investigate the eﬀect
of explicit instructions. We then present data from a follow-
up experiment in which comprehenders observed informative
uses of color-adjectives and under-informative uses of scalar
adjectives in the Generalization Phase. We predict a similar –
possibly slightly diminished – degree of informativity-based
generalization, which would rule out the possibility that the
generalization is limited to a particular adjective type.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two English-speaking adults residing in the USA who
had not previously participated in a study in this series were
compensated $1.00 for taking part in the task on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. We applied the same exclusion criteria as we
used in the previous experiments.
Materials
Identical to Experiment 2A.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2A, except that
participants received audio instructions instead of the written
instructions used in Experiments 1 and 2A. This was to ensure
that they heard all of the details of the instructions. Participants
were told that the goal of the task is to select instructions by
speakers that made the clearest or most natural instructions,
and that at the end of the task there would be an opportunity
for them to provide feedback on whether either of the speakers’
instructions were unusual in any way. At the end of the
experiment participants were asked to indicate which speaker
they thought was the clearest and most natural sounding, and
then were asked to describe why they thought the other speaker
was less clear or natural.7
Results and Discussion
When attention was called to the clarity of the two speaker’s
utterances, participants’ responses showed more pronounced
trends toward informativity-based generalizations. Participants
selected the talker who previously did not use adjectives in the
Exposure Phase in the (under-informative) color-modiﬁed trials,
88% of the time. As in Experiment 2A, the only reliable predictor
of whether the modifying talker was chosen was Instruction Type
(β = 8.109, p < 0.001), meaning that yet again we see evidence
for participants overall generalizing based on informativity.
7Themajority of the respondents indicated that that they thought that the less clear
speaker did not provide necessary adjectives / enough information to help pick
out objects, only four of the 32 respondents indicated that they thought one of
the speakers was less clear or natural for other reasons, such as the quality of the
speaker’s voice (n= 2), or thought they were both quite clear (n= 2). We take this
as evidence that the participants overall as a group interpreted the instructions to
be about the informativity of the instructions rather than features of the speakers’
voices.
Comparison of Experiments 2A and 2B
We compared Experiments 2A and 2B using a mixed-eﬀects
logistic regression analysis with Experiment (2A vs. 2B),
Adjective (exposed vs. new), and Instruction Type (scalar-
vs. color-modiﬁed) as ﬁxed eﬀects, and subject and item as
random eﬀects, including by-subject (Adjective and Instruction
Type) and by-item (Experiment and Instruction Type) random
intercepts and slopes. We used a random-slopes only model as
suggested by Barr et al. (2013), rather than a maximal model,
or a model with independent random slopes and intercepts,
as they both failed to converge. Instruction Type (β = 5.76,
p < 0.001), the interaction of Experiment by Instruction Type
(β = 2.888, p = 0.05), and a three-way interaction between the
ﬁxed eﬀects (β = 2.366, p = 0.01) were signiﬁcant predictors of
whether or not participants chose the modifying speaker. The
interaction of Instruction Type and Experiment supports the idea
that explicit instructions biased participants to generalize more
on informativity: with explicit instructions fewer participants
attributed the color-modiﬁed instructions to the non-modifying
(under-informative) talker, and fewer participants attributed
the scalar-modiﬁed instructions to the modifying talker (see
Figure 5). The explanation for the interactions will become clear
in the following analyses.
Mixture Model Analysis of Experiments 2A and 2B
Because we hypothesized that explicit instructions would result in
more informativity-based generalizations, we tested for patterns
of generalization across participants. We did so by ﬁtting
multivariate mixture models to the data. Separate models were
ﬁt for each Instruction Type in each of the conditions for 1-6
components using the mixtools package (Benaglia et al., 2009)
in R, which uses expectation maximization (EM) to estimate the
optimal parameter values.
On the scalar-modiﬁed trials, participants primarily attributed
these instructions to the modifying talker, and even more so in
Experiment 2B. In Experiment 2A our mixture model analysis
found that the majority (73%) of the participants selected the
modifying talker for the scalar adjective trials on average 98.2%
of the time, and the remaining 27% of participants selected the
modifying talker on average 35% of the time. In Experiment
2B the model found that the majority (88%) of the participants
selected the modifying talker for the scalar adjectives on average
98.2% of the time. The remaining 12% of the participants selected
the modifying talker on average 59% of the time.
For color-modiﬁed trials, in Experiment 2A, a three-
component model ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly better than the either
the one-component [χ2(6) = 373.2, p < 0.001] or the two-
component [χ2(3) = 18.8, p < 0.001] models. Participants
responses fell into the following three categories: (1) 12% of
the participants selected the modifying talker for these trials
98% of the time (evidence for form-based generalizations); (2)
30% of participants selecting the modifying talker 57% of the
time (approximately chance-like behavior, indicating that they
thought either speaker could have produced these instructions
with equal likelihood); and (3) the remaining 58% of the
participants picked the modifying talker only 5% of the time
(evidence for informativity-based generalizations). In contrast, in
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FIGURE 5 | Results from Experiment 2B, showing the proportion of responses given for the modifying talker by Instruction Type (left; light gray bars
reflect individual participant means), and the confidence ratings for responses by Instruction Type (right; diamond dots reflect the mean rating
out of 5).
Experiment 2B a two-component model ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly
better than a one-component model [χ2(3) = 305.1, p < 0.001]
or a three-component [χ2(3) = 0.14, p = 1] models. Individual
participants responded in one of two ways: (1) 81.2% of the
participants picked the modifying speaker only 5% of the time
(evidence for informativity-based generalizations); and (2) the
other 18.8% of the participants selected the modifying speaker
for these trials 75% of the time (evidence for form-based
generalizations).
This analysis reveals that there is more variability in
participant response patterns in Experiment 2A, compared to
Experiment 2B. This can be seen in the tighter clustering pattern
toward the top left corner in Experiment 2B in Figure 6.
If listeners generalizations are informativity-based, we expect
results to cluster in the top left (meaning that an individual always
picked the modifying speaker for the scalar-modiﬁed trials, thus
approaching 1, and almost never for the color-modiﬁed trials,
approaching 0), whereas if they were form-based we expect
clustering in the top right corner (where the proportion of
responses for the modifying speaker is near 1 for both instruction
types). In sum, calling attention to the quality of the instructions
made listeners more willing to infer that the non-modifying
speaker would be less pragmatically optimal and therefore more
likely to use an under-informative color-adjective.
Ruling out an Alternative Explanation based on
Adjective Class
One possible concern is that the results in Experiments 2A
and 2B could be due to listeners’ tendency to associate a
particular talker with a particular adjective type. Participants
might have assumed that one of the talkers liked to use
scalar adjectives and the other non-scalar adjectives. While
associations like these are not attested in any previous research,
it is possible that participants in the current study might have
inferred that, at the very least, one of the speakers was more
likely to use scalar adjectives than the other. To rule out this
possibility, we conducted an additional version of Experiment
2 (n = 32) in which the items in the Generalization Phase
contrasted in color rather than a scalar dimension. That is,
in contrast to Experiments 2A and 2B, color-adjectives in
the Generalization Phase were helpful in selecting a unique
referent whereas scalar adjectives were not. If participants
are generalizing based on informativity they should attribute
the contrastive, color-modiﬁed instructions to the modifying
speaker.
As in Experiments 2A and 2B, we found that the only reliable
predictor of whether participants selected the modifying speaker
was Instruction Type (β = 6.459, p = 0.05). Participants selected
the modifying speaker for the color-modiﬁed informative
instructions 84% of the time. Participants also selected the
modifying speaker for the non-informative scalar-modiﬁed
instructions. However, as we predicted, they did so less than for
the color-modiﬁed instruction (58% compared to 84%).
What accounts for the relatively high selection rate (58%)
of the previously modifying (informative) talker for the
under-informative scalar-modiﬁed instructions? We have two
hypotheses. First, listeners have weighted heavily their direct
observation of one talker using scalar adjectives in the Exposure
Phase. This might have made it diﬃcult for them to inhibit the
expectation that the previously modifying talker would continue
to use scalar adjectives. Second, unlike color-modiﬁers, talkers
in general rarely produce scalar-modiﬁers in non-contrastive
situations (Pechmann, 1989; Belke and Meyer, 2002; Sedivy,
2003; Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2008; Viethen et al.,
2012). Therefore, a listener would not expect a speaker who did
not use adjectives at all to begin producing a non-contrastive
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FIGURE 6 | Proportion of responses given for the modifying talker for color- by scalar-modified trials for each individual subject in Experiment 2A
and Experiment 2B. Informativity-based generalizations (dots expected to pattern in the top left) are observed when listeners primarily select the modifying talker
for the scalar-modified trials (proportion approaching 1.0) and rarely for the color-modified trials (proportion approaching 0.0). Form-based generalizations (dots
expected to pattern in the top right) are observed when listeners primarily select the modifying talker for both trials (proportions approaching 1.0).
scalar-modiﬁed utterance compared to a non-contrastive color-
modiﬁed utterance. In sum, these results provide additional
support for our claim that participants were paying attention to
the informativity of the talkers. As the same time, participants
may have diﬀerent expectations for diﬀerent classes of adjectives
(e.g., scalar- vs. color-adjectives) in terms of how reliably they
would support an informativity-based generalization.
EXPERIMENT 3: TALKER-SPECIFIC
ADAPTATION WITH OVER-INFORMATIVE
EVIDENCE
As we noted earlier, speakers rarely under-modify (except in
highly collaborative tasks; Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2008).
Do listeners’ prior beliefs based on general statistics like these
have any inﬂuence on ways in which they adapt their referential
expectations? If so, how? As we mentioned in the introduction,
the prevalent over-modiﬁcation observed in natural discourses in
contexts like the ones we used should lead to more conservative
generalization compared to cases of under-modiﬁcation. In
particular, listeners might consider that a single instance of a
redundant adjective use is not a good predictor of the same
speaker’s future pragmatic language use.
Integration of prior likelihoods into statistical inferences has
proven eﬀective in generalizing information meaningfully based
on a limited amount of the input. For instance, word learners
generalize information about novel word-referent mappings (e.g.,
“blicket” for a novel object) based on their prior beliefs about how
nouns are used, who provided the data, and how the evidence is
sampled (Xu and Tenenbaum, 2007). They then make inferences
about how readily an observed word-referent mapping should be
generalizable to other referents of the same kind rather than being
restricted to a unique individual or property. Thus, by integrating
relevant prior beliefs, listeners are able to evaluate the input with
respect to how reliably it can predict previously unseen data,
which helps reduce the chance of over- or under-generalization
due to over-ﬁtting their expectations to data observed locally.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-two English-speaking adults residing in the USA who
had not previously participated in a study in this series were
compensated $1.00 for taking part in the task on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. We applied the same exclusion criteria as
what we used in previous experiments. An additional participant
completed the task but was excluded from the analysis for giving
incorrect responses during the Exposure Phase.
Materials
Audio stimuli for the Exposure Phase (20 items) were identical
to those in Experiments 1 and 2. Visual stimuli were modiﬁed
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FIGURE 7 | Results from Experiment 3, showing the proportion of responses given for the modifying speaker by Instruction Type (left), and the
confidence ratings for responses by Instruction Type (right; diamond dots reflect the mean rating out of 5).
so that there was no size contrast pair and each two-by-two grid
consisted of four singleton images. This manipulation rendered
a non-modifying instruction to be concisely informative (e.g.,
“Click on the cake”), and a modiﬁed instruction to be over-
informative (e.g., “Click on the big cake”). Visual stimuli in
the Generalization Phase (24 items) were identical to those in
Experiments 1 and 2, containing a visual contrast pair. 12 of
the 24 items were associated with a single-modiﬁed instruction
(e.g., “Click on the wide bottle”) and the rest were associated with
a double-modiﬁed instruction with both an informative scalar
adjective and a redundant color adjective (e.g., “Click on the wide
green bottle”). We predicted that if listeners were generalizing
on informativity, rather than form, that they should attribute
the single-modiﬁed (concisely informative) instructions to the
previously non-modifying speaker, and the double-modiﬁed
instructions (over-informative) to the modifying speaker, who
appears to be habitually over-informative.
Procedure
As in the previous experiments, participants completed all the
20 exposure trials and 24 generalization trials consecutively.
Participants read the same instructions used in Experiments 1
and 2A. Participants rated their conﬁdence on each trial.
Results and Discussion
In contrast to the cases with an under-modifying talker (i.e.,
Experiments 1 and 2), the results from Experiment 3 show no
clear evidence for informativity-based generalization (Figure 7).
In a mixed-eﬀects logistic regression Instruction Type (concise-
or over-modiﬁcation) was not a reliable predictor (p > 0.1), nor
was the interaction of Instruction Type and Adjective (p > 0.1).
The only reliable predictor of when participants would choose the
modifying (over-informative) speaker was whether a previously
encountered or a new scalar adjective was used (β = 0.959,
p = 0.05): participants were more likely to choose the modifying
speaker if a previously exposed adjective (big or small) was
used (67%) regardless of whether it was used with a color
adjective. For the new adjectives, there was no clear trend for
participants to attribute the use of the new adjectives to either
speaker, attributing them equally to both speakers (choosing the
modifying speaker in for 52% of the responses).
As predicted, we found an asymmetry between the cases of
under-modiﬁcation and over-modiﬁcation, in which listeners
do not seem to make talker-speciﬁc informativity-based
generalizations from exposure to over-modiﬁed instructions.
This null eﬀect with over-informative input was, however,
somewhat surprising given the reliable eﬀects of talker
informativity found in Experiments 1 and 2. Before we
conclude that this pattern of results is due to participants
being more conservative about generalizing from over-
informative utterances, we need to rule out another possibility.
Perhaps participants did not notice that one of the talkers was
over-modifying in the Exposure Phase.
Ruling out an Alternative Explanation based on a
Failure to Generalize overall for Over-Informative
Utterances
Unlike the under-modifying instructions used in Experiments
1 and 2, over-modifying instructions do not create referential
ambiguity. Thus, if talker-speciﬁc adaptation requires an
observation of a clear “error” signal based on possible
miscommunication, then the manipulation we used might
have been too subtle to trigger adaptation, To address this
possibility we conducted a follow-up experiment (n = 32),
modeled on Experiment 1 to see if we could observe form-based
generalizations. Participants observed the same two speakers
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describing images from a two-by-two grid that was comprised
entirely of unrelated singleton images (as in Experiment 3)
in both the Exposure Phase and the Generalization Phase.
Thus, in both the Exposure Phase and the Generalization
Phase modiﬁed instructions were over-informative, and non-
modiﬁed instructions were concisely informative. The results
demonstrated that participants were more willing to attribute
the over-modiﬁed utterances to the modifying speaker (85%
compared to 18% for the non-modiﬁed), regardless of the
adjective used (β = 10.27, p < 0.001). This makes it unlikely
that participants in Experiment 3 were simply not aware of
talker-diﬀerences in the Exposure Phase. It is, however, still
possible that they did not regard over-informative utterances to
be communicatively sub-optimal because they did not cause any
referential ambiguity.
To see whether this might be the case for our instruction,
we looked at responses in the follow-up questionnaire in
Experiment 3 (identical to that of Experiment 2B), which
asked participants to comments on the clarity and naturalness
of the two talkers’ instructions. Participants were divided as
to which talker they preferred: some participants found the
over-modifying talker to be clearer and more helpful (23%);
others considered the over-modifying talker to be redundant
and potentially confusing (45%). The remaining participants
commented on the quality of the speakers’ voices, the recordings,
or gave no response (32%). Thus the asymmetrical treatment
of under- and over-modifying utterances could be due in part
to listeners not considering over-modifying utterances to be
communicatively sub-optimal. This would make it less likely for
them to expect similar behavior from the same talker across
diﬀerent contexts. In Experiment 4, wemanipulated the Exposure
phase of Experiment 3 to highlight the fact that producing
over-modifying instructions can, at least in some cases, hinder
referential communication.
EXPERIMENT 4: DRAWING MORE
ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT
OVER-INFORMATIVE INFORMATION IS
NOT HELPFUL
In Experiment 3, and in previous research (Engelhardt et al.,
2006; Arts et al., 2011), listeners have been shown to treat
some instances of over-speciﬁcation as facilitatory. In Experiment
4, we introduced two modiﬁcations to the paradigm used in
Experiment 3, with the intention of highlighting the potential
pitfalls of over-modiﬁcation in the current referential task. First,
we truncated 50% of the audio instructions such that the concise
referential expressions communicated suﬃcient information for
unique referent identiﬁcation (e.g., “Click on the ca-” when a
target is “camera”) whereas the over-modiﬁed expressions do
not (e.g., “Click on the sma-” when there is more than one
small referent in a visual scene). Second, after each trial, we
provided feedback identifying the talker’s intended referent. We
implemented these changes to emphasize the fact that producing
a superﬂuous adjective can result in referential ambiguity.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-four English-speaking adults residing in the USA who
had not previously participated in a study in this series were
compensated $1.00 for taking part in the task on Amazon
Mechanical Turk. We applied the same exclusion criteria as what
we used in the previous experiments.
Materials
Visual and audio stimuli were identical to Experiment 3 except
for the following three changes in the Exposure Phase. First, the
audio instructions were truncated mid way: ﬁve out of the 10
unmodiﬁed instructions were cut oﬀ after the onset syllable of
the noun (e.g., “Click on the ca-” when a target is “camera”), the
remainder were truncated mid-word after the second consonant
(e.g., “Click on the cam-”). Five of the 10 modiﬁed instructions
were truncated after the adjective (e.g., “Click on the small” when
there is more than one small referent in a visual scene), and the
remaining modiﬁed instructions were truncated after the onset
syllable of the noun (e.g., “Click on the small ca-”)8.
Secondly, half of the Exposure Phase trials contained two-by-
two grids with a contrast pair, and half contained four singleton
items. Crucially the instructions produced by both speakers
never referred to an item from the contrasting pair. Third, after
each trial participants were shown which item the speaker was
originally asked to describe. On the trials where the recording
was cut oﬀ after the adjective, it was expected that the use of
the redundant scalar adjective would be seen as misleading. An
example trial from Experiment 4 can be seen in Figure 8. The
Generalization Phase was identical to that of Experiment 3.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 3.
Results and Discussion
Despite the changes we made to the Exposure Phase, the results
were nearly identical to those in Experiment 3 (Figure 9). In
a mixed-eﬀects logistic regression Instruction Type was not a
signiﬁcant predictor of whether participants chose the modifying
speaker (β = 0.169, p > 0.1), However, whether an exposed or
a new adjective was used was a signiﬁcant predictor (β = 0.635,
p = 0.05). Participants were overall more likely to attribute the
instructions containing the words big or small to the modifying
8We chose this manipulation over more overt ways of highlighting over-
informativity of the modifying-talker’s utterances such as saying “This speaker
has only four words to spend” for the following two reasons. First, we were
concerned that a word limit (“This speaker has up to four words to spend”)
would make the task highly unnatural. We could not ﬁnd a naturalistic context
in which a speaker needs to control the number of words in a spoken sentence
and we did not know how our participants would construe a situation like that.
Second, if we introduced a word or a time limit in the introduction, listeners
would likely expect the speaker to alter the syntactic structure of their instruction
(e.g., “big apple” rather than “Click on a big apple”) and/or increase their speech
rate. However, including modulations like these would introduce other unknown
factors such as (un)intelligibility of instructions, which wouldmake the experiment
less comparable to the other experiments reported in the current paper. For
these reasons, we used the cover-story, which supports the assumption that the
speakers were unaware of this problem and hence their syntactic and phonological
formulations of instructions were consistent with those in other experiments.
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FIGURE 8 | An example of a trial (audio instructions are shown here in
speech bubbles) with the modifying speaker (left) in the Exposure
Phase in Experiment 4. Participants clicked on the image in the grid to
respond. After each trial participants were shown which of the four images the
speaker was asked to describe (right).
speaker (62%) than the instructions containing new adjectives
(50%), regardless of the Instruction Type (single modiﬁed, or
double-modiﬁed, as noted by the lack of an interaction predictor).
The results of Experiment 4 strongly suggest that the absence
of evidence for generalization in a talker-speciﬁc manner from
over-informative evidence is not due to listeners failing to register
its sub-optimality in the communicative task at hand. It is more
likely that listeners did not weigh evidence of over-informative
instructions asmuch as that of under-informative ones, leading to
more conservative generalization of their referential expectations
at the talker level.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We proposed that listeners adjust their expectations for
how individual talkers might vary in their uses of referring
expressions. This permits listeners to maintain the assumption
that talkers are generally rational, rather than only sometimes
rational, while allowing them to ﬂexibly cope with the variability
in speakers’ referring expressions. We presented four sets of
talker-selection experiments, examining if, and, if so, how,
listeners adapt and generalize their referential expectations
according to the observed input. We examined cases in which
one of the two talkers produced either an under-modiﬁed or an
over-modiﬁed utterance for a referent in a visually co-present
context.
Summary of Results and Contribution
Under-Modification
With under-modiﬁed instructions, we found clear evidence that
listeners adapted to talker-speciﬁc diﬀerences in the use of
pre-nominal adjectives along the dimension of informativity.
When a talker under-modiﬁed, listeners inferred that that talker
would not formulate an informative utterance with other scalar
adjectives (Experiments 1 and 2). Moreover, they considered
the possibility that the same talker would formulate under-
informative utterances with color adjectives (Experiment 2). This
demonstrates that listeners generalized the information given
in the Exposure Phase based on informativity. Importantly,
we found evidence for informativity-based generalizations even
when the evidence was implicit. However, the proportion
of informativity-based generalizations increased when the
instructions directed participants to pay attention to the clarity
of the talkers’ instructions.
Our results with under-modiﬁed instructions build on
Grodner and Sedivy’s (2011) results in three ways. First, Grodner
and Sedivy reported that talker-speciﬁc modulation of pragmatic
processing, in their paradigm, required explicit top–down
information about the speaker being pragmatically impaired
(though they mention that there was still a trend when top–down
information was not provided). In contrast, our experiments
with under-modiﬁcation induced talker-speciﬁc adaptation of
referential expectation without such an explicit instruction. This
suggests that listeners are in principle capable of modulating
their expectations based on bottom–up input alone. Second, our
results contrasted generalizations based on under- and over-
informative utterances, and thereby shed light on the dimensions
over which listeners are generalization. Third, we show that,
depending on the participant and the task, generalization can be
more or less form-based and informativity-based.
Over-Modification
With a speaker who regularly over-modiﬁes, we did not
observe informativity-based generalization (Experiment 3).
Even when a superﬂuous modiﬁer was clearly unhelpful in
reference resolution, listeners did not assume that overly
informative utterances were a characteristic of an individual
talker (Experiment 4). Listeners did make talker-speciﬁc
generalizations, but they were overwhelmingly form-based
rather than informativity-based. Our results with over-modiﬁed
instructions might seem superﬁcially inconsistent with Grodner
and Sedivy’s evidence for talker-speciﬁc adaptation with over-
modiﬁed instructions. Recall, however, that some researchers
(Arnold et al., 2007; Grodner and Sedivy, 2011) noted that they
obtained robust results only when they explicitly called attention
to the speaker’s overall linguistic incompetence. Thus our results
can be viewed, akin to the ﬁndings of Grodner and Sedivy,
as supporting the suggestion that generalization from over-
modiﬁcation is strongest when there is top–down information
that establishes a causal link between the redundant use of a
prenominal modiﬁer and the pragmatic propensities, or even, the
linguistic competence, of the talker.
The asymmetry between the results with under-modiﬁcation
and over-modiﬁcation is particularly striking. It provides strong
support for the assumption that generalization takes into account
prior beliefs based on the statistical structure of the data, in this
case typical patterns of modiﬁcation. We discussed the possibility
that informativity-based generalizations might be weaker with
over-modiﬁcation than with under-modiﬁcation because under-
modifying utterances interfere more with communication in
the task at hand. Admittedly, under-modifying utterances do
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FIGURE 9 | Results from Experiment 4, showing the proportion of responses given for the modifying speaker by Instruction Type (left), and the
confidence ratings for responses by Instruction Type (right; diamond dots reflect the mean rating out of 5).
not allow listeners to single out a unique referent, which
calls attention to the sub-optimality of those utterances. In
contrast, over-modifying utterances, allow listeners to pick out
an intended referent. In fact, providing additional information
is often considered a sign of helpfulness (Engelhardt et al.,
2006; Arts et al., 2011). The likelihood of communicative
error in a given context cannot, however, account for our
pattern of results. The truncated utterances in Experiment 4
created referential ambiguity, drawing attention to the fact that
by including superﬂuous material the over-modifying talker
generated referring expressions that resulted in communication
failure.
It is possible that general inferences about informativity
from over-modiﬁcation might emerge only with more robust
manipulations in highly collaborative tasks, e.g., in a video game
task where timely actions based on communication with a partner
are required. Alternatively, because oﬄine measures do not
capture real-time expectations, an online measure might reveal
eﬀects that are not captured in oﬄine measures, e.g., reaction
times (Engelhardt et al., 2011), or eye-tracking (Grodner and
Sedivy, 2011). We leave the question of under what conditions,
if any, listeners might make informativity generalizations based
on over-modiﬁcation as an issue for future research. Nonetheless
our results clearly demonstrate that prior beliefs of the listener
about characteristics of referring expressions, and not just
the optimality of an utterance with respect to a particular
context, are an important factor for understanding reference
generation and understanding. Along these lines, it will be
important in future research to further investigate reasons
why speakers might include more information in a referential
expression than is strictly necessary for identifying a referent
(for discussion see Isaacs and Clark, 1987; also Heller et al.,
2012; Gorman et al., 2013; Gegg-Harrison and Tanenhaus,
in review).
We began by considering how listeners might make
rational use of linguistic information despite the fact that
the linguistic input often includes more or less information
than what is necessary and suﬃcient for a given referential
intention. The current results help provide a critical piece
of the puzzle: listeners can ﬂexibly adapt their estimates
of an expected amount of information associated with the
given referential intention. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that the
process of adaptation includes statistical inferences. Those
inferences are conditioned on factors such as types of
evidence (under- and over-informative), classes of adjectives,
and listeners’ prior beliefs about how reliably a particular
type of non-optimal utterance would convey information
about whether the talker would be non-optimal in the
future.
Individual Differences
Although it was not a main focus of our study, the results in
Experiments 2A and 2B revealed clear individual diﬀerences
among participants with regard to their construal of the
referential task. In Experiment 2B, we used an identical
set of visual and audio stimuli as in Experiment 2A while
drawing participants’ attention to the fact that this is a task
about evaluating the quality of instructions produced by
two individual talkers. This manipulation made participants’
responses signiﬁcantly more uniform such that a larger
proportion of participants provided responses that indicated
informativity-based, rather than form-based, generalization.
This suggests that participants vary in their construal of a
task, a context, and a goal of referential communication
even in a simple paradigm like the one we used in our
study (for individual diﬀerences in semantic and pragmatic
interpretations of utterances, see Noveck and Posada,
2003; Bott and Noveck, 2004; Degen and Tanenhaus, 2015;
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Yildirim et al., 2016). Importantly, participants’ assumptions
about the task can determine the dimensions along which
they generalize (see Brown-Schmidt and Fraundorf (2015) for
evidence that perceived interaction inﬂuences use of common
ground information).
Future Directions
The diﬀerences among participants suggest that one fruitful
direction for future research will be to look at various contextual
factors that likely inﬂuence the process of speaker-speciﬁc
generalization of referential expectations. We mentioned
in the introduction that studies on phonetic adaptation
and generalization revealed that listeners structure their
knowledge with respect to talker groups and situations. For
instance, listeners do not indiscriminately generalize their
knowledge about one talker’s speech categories to a diﬀerent
talker, but facilitation after exposure to multiple talkers
with the same foreign accent generalizes to new speakers
with the same or similar accents (Bradlow and Bent, 2008).
Similarly, listeners may be able to structure their expectations
for referential expressions according to speaker groups or
conversational contexts. For instance, adult speakers may
produce more redundant modiﬁers when talking to a young
child compared to when talking to another adult (e.g., Look
at the big brown doggy! when there is only one dog in
sight). Integrating contextual factors like this would help
listeners “explain away” some of the variability observed
within a speaker and further reduces the risk of under- or
over-generalization.
We believe that our results have implications for research
in reference production, including reference expression
generation models (REG models). Models to date appear to
take into account some manner of contextual information,
primarily including referents that are visually or linguistically
present in the context (see Krahmer and van Deemter,
2012, for a survey of work in REG to date). Some models
attempt to accommodate interlocutor-speciﬁc information
(e.g., Heeman and Hirst, 1995; Jordan and Walker, 2005)
by producing referential expressions that reﬂect conceptual
pact information (referential expressions that have been
negotiated between particular interlocutors, see Clark and
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Brennan and Clark, 1996). We propose
that future models of reference production should also take
into account how interlocutors negotiate their referential
expressions to ﬁnd the most optimal level of reference given
their certainty about the contextual and mutually shared
information. In particular, such models should examine
how these expectations might change over time given
both the evidence at hand, and the interlocutors’ prior
beliefs.
Another fruitful line of research is examining how children
treat under- and over-modifying utterances and whether
they adapt their referential expectations in a talker-speciﬁc
manner. Previous studies have reported that preschoolers
can discriminate talkers’ pragmatic abilities (e.g., Koenig
and Harris, 2005; Scoﬁeld and Behrend, 2008), based on
utterances with clear errors (e.g., using “key” to refer to
a ball). It is, however, yet to be clear whether they can
distinguish talkers based on the quantity of information
provided (Eskritt et al., 2008). We have conducted a preliminary
study using a paradigm similar to Experiment 1 in the
current paper. We found that preschoolers, unlike adults,
have diﬃculty associating under-modifying utterances with
an individual talker (Pogue et al., 2015). This may be due
to a number of possible reasons including their limited
memory and attention span, general insensitivity to pragmatic
principles in conversation and weaker assumptions for
across-talker variability. Further investigation, both oﬄine
judgment studies like ours as well as online eye-movement
studies, is necessary to paint a complete picture of the
developmental trajectory of the ability to derive referential
expectations.
Finally, our results open up a number of questions as to
what is intended by informativity. As we discussed in the
introduction, most theories so far have deﬁned informativity
as an expected amount of information with respect to an
array of referents in a visual scene. Anything that exceeds
the amount is considered over-informative and anything
that falls short of it is considered under-informative. And
these deviations are expected to trigger pragmatic inferences.
Our results, however, yield strong support for the view
that what counts as informative can change depending on
a talker and a context. Listeners constantly update their
expectations as they gain more information about the talker
and the context. Future studies on informativity should
therefore explore processes in which the speaker and the
listener negotiate means and a context of reference, reducing
uncertainty regarding form-referent mappings in a collaborative
dialog.
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